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The International Monetary Fund and the 
Global Spread of Privatization
NANCY BRUNE, GEOFFREY GARRETT, and BRUCE KOGUT*
Well over a trillion dollars worth of state-owned firms have been privatized since
1980. The traditional argument is that governments choose to privatize in response
to fiscal pressures. In this study, the authors examine the impact of IFI conditionality
on privatization and find that IMF conditionality, in particular, has an important indi-
rect economic benefit. Investors are willing to pay more for privatized assets in coun-
tries that owe the IMF money (and hence that are subject to the policy constraints
attached to the loans). The reason for this is that investors view IMF conditionality
as a signal of credible policy reform. The magnitude of this effect is striking. For every
dollar a developing country owed the IMF in the early 1980s, it subsequently priva-
tized state-owned assets worth roughly 50c. Admittedly, this “credibility bonus” of
IMF lending may not justify the policy conditions typically imposed by the IMF.
However, the additional capital drawn into developing countries as a result of the
IMF-privatization nexus is no doubt helpful to these economies. [JEL L3, F33, F34]
T
he sale of state-owned assets—privatization—has been a defining characteris-
tic of the global economy in the last two decades of the twentieth century.
More than 8,000 acts of privatization were completed around the world between
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ful comments.1985 and 1999 (Brune, 2004).1 These sales were valued at more than $1.1 trillion
(in constant 1985 U.S. dollars). After an initial large spike in 1987 (when almost
$120 billion in state-owned assets were sold in only 77 transactions, mostly by
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries), pri-
vatization swept the globe in the 1990s (see Figure 1). From an average of roughly
$50 billion per year (on 500–1,000 transactions) in the early 1990s, revenues from
global privatizations grew to $87 billion on more than 1,700 transactions by 1995,
peaking in 1998 at $171 billion of assets sold in 2,500 transactions. Although
almost two-thirds of the privatization activity in terms of revenues took place in
high-income countries, the bulk of privatization transactions occurred in low- and
middle-income countries (see Table 1).
Appendix I presents country-level data for 1985 to 1999. Privatization revenues
exceeded $100 billion (in 1985 dollars) in Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and
over $50 billion in Australia, Brazil, and France. Relative to their GDPs, the five
largest privatizers were Bolivia, Guyana, Hungary, Panama, and Portugal, each of
which had sold state-owned assets worth more than 30 percent of their 1985 GDPs
by 1999. Privatization revenues exceeded 25 percent of 1985 GDP in another four
countries—Australia, Chile, Malaysia, and New Zealand. By 1999, total revenues
from privatization exceeded 5 percent of 1985 GDP in 60 countries.
What explains the spread of privatization around the world? In most economic
theories, privatization increases productivity, efficiency, and output. Even though
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1These numbers do not include, nor do we analyze, the disposition of assets by mass/voucher privati-
zation in the former socialist countries. Our analysis of privatization transactions counts separately different
























































































































Figure 1. Privatization Over Timethe empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, most economists continue to support
privatization. But if it is efficient to sell off state-owned assets, why have we
observed dramatic variations among countries in the extent and pace of privatiza-
tion? Were countries more likely to privatize if they had large state-owned sectors
initially, or if they confronted economic crises, or for other reasons?
In this paper we concentrate on the impact of lending by international financial
institutions, both the IMF and World Bank, on privatization around the world. We
demonstrate that countries that borrowed from the IMF subsequently privatized
more assets (in terms of market valuations at the time of sale), controlling for the
effects of the initial size of the state-owned sector, fiscal imbalances, per capita
income, the depth of capital markets, and the quality of government. Indeed, we
estimate that for every dollar a country owed the IMF, it subsequently privatized
assets worth approximately 50 cents. In contrast, World Bank loans were not sig-
nificantly associated with increased privatization revenues, though there was no
evidence that countries with loans from the World Bank privatized less.
Two interpretations are consistent with these results. On the one hand, IMF
conditionality (which is generally considered to be more constraining than that
imposed by the World Bank) could have forced recipient governments to privatize
more state-owned assets (in terms of volume). On the other hand, global capital
markets could have valued more highly the sale of (a given volume of) state assets
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Table 1. Privatization by Region and Per Capita Income, 1985–1999
Average Average 
Revenues Revenues  Revenues 
(billions, (percent 1985  per Transaction 
1985 US$) GDP, unweighted) Transactions (millions, 1985 US$)
By region:
East Asia and the Pacific 318.0 13.3 831 382.7
Eastern Europe and  23.3 14.0 2,453 9.5
Central Asia
Latin America and  197.3 13.9 1,601 123.2
the Caribbean
Middle East and  19.9 6.9 419 47.5
North Africa
North America and  522.2 8.9 871 599.5
Western Europe
Southeast Asia 11.4 5.2 335 34.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.5 5.4 1,662 5.7
By per capita income:1
Low income 62.0 8.4 2,782 22.3
Middle income 265.9 10.2 4,269 62.3
High income 773.7 9.9 1,121 690.2
Total 1,101.6 9.6 8,172 134.8
Source: Brune, 2004.
1Based on per capita GDP (atlas method) in 1980.in countries that received assistance from the IMF—as a result of the increased
credibility of commitments to market-promoting policies in these countries. We
cannot easily distinguish between the conditionality and credibility interpretations
because it is extremely difficult to isolate the volume of privatized assets indepen-
dently from their valuation. Our results show that IMF conditionality was associ-
ated both with higher privatization revenues and with more privatization
transactions, but the revenues’ effects were stronger and very robust. Thus, we
subscribe to the credibility interpretation of our IMF effect over a simpler condi-
tionality interpretation: the imposition of IMF conditions in a country won the
approval of global capital markets for its privatization program (in a similar argu-
ment to that proposed by Perotti and van Oijen, 2001).
I. Privatization: Efficiency or Commitment?
Privatization is an economic policy whose cross-national spread has a familiar
logistic S-shape. After the initial wave of sales of state-owned assets in Britain in
the early 1980s (and earlier still in Chile), privatization programs began to emerge
in other countries: at first in other OECD nations but then in developing and tran-
sition economies as well.2
Why did privatization spread in this fashion? There is some prima facie evi-
dence that countries with larger state-owned sectors were also in economic diffi-
culty in the early 1980s, particularly with respect to fiscal imbalances. It is
plausible that they privatized in response to these problems. But the connection
between economic distress and privatization presupposes that countries were con-
fident that privatization would help their economies.
The evidence on this critical point, however, is mixed—particularly from stud-
ies completed before the mid-1990s. Research on early privatizations in the United
Kingdom suggested that firm and sector performance improved only when priva-
tization was coupled with the creation of truly competitive markets (Vickers and
Yarrow, 1988). Some cross-national studies subsequently found that privatization
improved performance at the firm level (Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh,
1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Ramamurti, 1996, 1997; Galal and others,
1994; Galal and Shirley, 1994), but other studies disputed this conclusion (Black,
Kraakman, Tarassova, 2000; Bevan and others, 2001). In an important recent arti-
cle, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) found that firms that were subsequently pri-
vatized performed better in the three years before they were sold off (as
governments prepared them for sale) but that the performance of these firms once
privatized was no better than that of other firms. But even if one were to accept
Megginson and Netter’s (2001) conclusion that privatization, on balance, has been
good for firms and economies, it would still be important to note that the empiri-
cal evidence was not available to the governments that chose to privatize in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The lateness of empirical support for the benefits of priva-
tization coupled with its relative weakness should caution against a rapid endorse-
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2Bangladesh, Germany, Mali, and South Africa also privatized tiny shares of their state-owned assets
in the early 1980s.ment of a simple efficiency explanation for the spread of privatization in the past
couple of decades.
In this paper, we explore another potential causal path that does not require
the assumption that privatization directly improves firm or sector performance.
Governments in countries with economic problems, as well as high levels of state
ownership, face a credibility problem. Even good firms will not attract sufficient
funding because of political uncertainty. Perotti and van Oijen (2001) argue that pri-
vatization provides the appropriate commitment technology to attract investors in
the case of distressed economies. They present evidence that national credit ratings
subsequently improved in countries that privatized significant state-owned assets.
If this line of argument is correct, privatization could still be beneficial to
economies by attracting investment, even if it does not improve the efficiency of
either privatized firms or the product markets in which they compete. There is,
however, a chicken and egg problem in this privatization-credibility dynamic.
Governments without strong credit ratings, particularly in emerging economies,
are likely to be forced to privatize initially at discounted prices to attract investors,
given the time needed for investors to gain confidence that governments are indeed
credibly committed to pro-market reforms.
It is at this point that the international financial institutions (IFIs) may play a
pivotal role. Both the IMF and the World Bank provide loans (and in the latter
case, some grants as well) to developing countries, but they stipulate conditions
for disbursement.3 Since governments in developing countries often need IFI
financing to stabilize their economies or fund their development programs, condi-
tionality may generate credible commitments to the IFIs’agendas—at least to the
extent that the IMF and the World Bank themselves are internationally credible
market reformers. In turn, this credibility could increase future investors’ confi-
dence in buying shares in firms privatized in countries that owe money to the IMF
or the World Bank.
IMF conditionality is generally considered to be much more binding than is the
World Bank’s. The Fund plays a strong role in monitoring and enforcing compli-
ance, and failure to meet any specified condition often means that the next tranche
of loans is not released. In contrast, World Bank performance criteria for loans are
often not stated as quantitative targets, and punishment for failure to perform is rare
(Polak, 1994). It should also be noted that the Fund and World Bank do not stipu-
late cross-conditionality, whereby failure to meet a condition of one institution’s
loan constitutes suspension of the other institution’s loans to that country.
Since 1997, the IMF has made information on its conditionality requirements
publicly available. Recent agreements (letters of intent) confirm what was previ-
ously conjecture—namely, that for more than a decade, the IMF has included pri-
vatization as a standard condition of its structural adjustment lending (Davis and
others, 2000). Insiders often attribute the birth of the idea of privatization condi-
tionality to a speech by Secretary of State James Baker at the Seoul meetings of
the IMF and World Bank in 1985 (Polak, 1994). The idea quickly gained other
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3Though the Bretton Woods-era charters of the two organizations differ significantly, they have evolved
into institutions with overlapping jurisdictions regarding structural adjustment lending.adherents inside the Washington-based international policy community beltway so
much so that John Williamson (1993) included privatization among the policies in
the Washington Consensus between the U.S. Treasury and the IFIs in the late
1980s and early 1990s.4
It is not clear whether the IFIs’ efforts to condition financing on privatization
and other reforms has improved macroeconomic performance. Przeworski and
Vreeland (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Vreeland, 2003) recently found that
participation in IMF loan programs actually reduced national economic growth,
even after selection bias among slow-growth countries was taken into account.
Using a similar methodology, Abouharb (2001) argued that World Bank loans
have had no discernible impact on growth rates in recipient countries.
As we have suggested, the case for privatization need not rest upon direct effi-
ciency gains. The value of an acquisition or share purchase is influenced by expec-
tations about the future, with respect both to economic performance (at the firm,
sector, and national levels) and to government policy (regulation, taxes, national-
ization, etc.). Participation in IFI programs may signal that a country is credibly
committed to economic reforms from which asset holders will benefit. If a coun-
try privatizes when it is subject to an IFI program, investors may be more likely to
buy shares in state assets that are sold and to pay a higher price for them, expect-
ing that government policy will be more market friendly.
Recent studies have explored the effect of IFI lending on capital flows. Bird
and Rowlands (1997, forthcoming) find limited support for the argument that IMF
lending has a catalytic effect on capital flows in general. Mody and Saravia
(2003), however, claim that the IMF does have a catalytic effect but only when
country conditions (debt and reserve ratios) are such that the IMF has a credible
influence on policies. In this paper, we extend the inquiry by exploring whether
there is a more focused effect of IMF (and World Bank) lending on privatization.
II. The Data
Data Sources
The privatization data used in this paper are derived from the Global Privatization
Database (GPD) (Brune, 2004). Almost half of the privatization transactions in
GPD were originally reported in the World Bank Privatization Database (WBPD)
(2000) on developing countries.5 Three other published sources were used to com-
pile GPD: the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database (PPID)
(2000) for developing countries, the World Bank African Privatization Database
(WBAPD) (2002), and the Thomson Financial IFR Platinum Privatization
International Database (PID) (1999) focusing on high and upper middle-income
countries. GPD also includes almost 6,000 transactions derived from a variety of
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4Williamson originally formulated the term Washington Agenda, or the Washington Consensus, in a
background paper “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” for a conference held by the Institute for
International Economics in November 1989, which was published as the opening chapter in the conference
volume The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America (1990).
5For all World Bank privatization information, see http://www.privatizationlink.org.other sources, including government documents, international organizations, aca-
demic journals, newspapers, industry and consulting reports, and other previously
published volumes on privatization.6
We  analyze annual observations on privatizations from 1985 to 1999 in 96
countries for which all relevant data are available (see Appendix I). Of these (both
developing and developed) economies, 91 privatized assets during the analysis
period.7 We also include another five countries that did not privatize but for which
all the other data are available (Bahamas, Botswana, Cyprus, Suriname, and Syria).
Our analysis draws on a much larger sample of countries than those used in
other cross-national studies of privatization, such as Megginson, Nash, and van
Randenborgh (1994) and Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (1998, 2001).
The generic version of our estimated equations regressed privatization rev-
enues (as a percentage of GDP) on the following variables: (the log of) per capita
income, the size of the state-owned sector in 1980, the national budgetary balance,
an index of the quality of government institutions, the presence of a functioning
stock market, our variables measuring IFI obligations, and region and time dum-
mies. We also use privatization transactions as a dependent variable in an effort to
distinguish the market’s valuation of a privatized asset (i.e., revenues derived from
privatization) from the amount of assets privatized (transactions). But since the trans-
actions measure counts equally—for example, the wholesale selling off of a national
telecoms monopoly with the bit-by-bit sale (in tranches) of a small company—
we concentrate on privatization revenues.
The initial extent of government ownership of the economy placed an upper
limit on the amount of privatization a country could subsequently have undertaken.
Hence we expect a positive coefficient on this parameter. Theoretically, the most
desirable measure of the size of the state-owned sector is the share of GDP derived
from state-owned enterprises. But these data are available for only a relatively small
set of countries beginning in the late 1980s, and it is not clear precisely how these
estimates were calculated. Instead, we rely on a simpler ordinal indicator (0–10) of
the size of the state-owned sector from Economic Freedom of the World, which con-
tains information on a large sample of developing and developed countries going
back to the mid-1970s (Gwartney, Lawson, and Block, 1996).8
It is commonly assumed that governments tend to privatize when they need to
generate revenues to balance the public fiscal balance sheet. To test this argument,
we include the central government’s budget balance as a portion of GDP. Since
positive scores denote fiscal surpluses, we expect the budget balance coefficients
to be negative in the privatization regressions.
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6In the compilation of GPD, data that overlapped but were discordant were reconciled based on the
following rank order of data quality (in descending order): PPID, WBPD, WBAPD, and PID. Data and
information gathered from the search of additional primary and secondary materials helped supplement
and correct missing information on individual privatization transactions.
7The regional distributions among these countries were as follows: East Asia and the Pacific—11
countries; Eastern Europe and Central Asia—3; Latin America and the Caribbean—22; Middle East and
North Africa—10; North America and Western Europe—20; South Asia—4; Sub-Saharan Africa—21.
8In countries with a score of 10, more than 30 percent of the economy was derived from economic
activity of the state-owned sector; in countries that scored a 0, less than 1 percent of economic output was
derived from state-owned enterprises.GDP per capita was included to control for the effects of a country’s level of
development on privatization revenues. Positive coefficients would imply that
higher per capita incomes promoted privatization, perhaps because more devel-
oped countries were better equipped to undertake privatization. Negative param-
eter estimates would suggest that less developed countries had a greater need to
privatize.
We explore arguments about development with some more fine-grained mea-
sures as well. It has been argued that countries with developed market-promoting
institutions are more likely to privatize. To measure the overall quality of gover-
nance in a country, we use an index derived from a set of International Country
Risk Guide indicators first employed by Knack and Keefer (1995): the sum of
scores for corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law (all measured on a
0–10 scale, with higher scores reflecting better governance). We would expect
estimated parameters for the government quality index to be positive.
Our analyses also control for whether a country had a functioning stock mar-
ket (a 0–1 dummy variable). It is likely that privatized assets would be valued
more highly in countries with well-functioning domestic capital markets that
reduce information asymmetries and emphasize corporate governance (Levine,
1997; Holmström and Tirole, 1993). Controlling for these governance and market
effects, we expect the residual impact of per capita income on privatization to be
negative—because poorer countries have a greater need to privatize.
The central hypothesis we wish to test, however, is that countries that enter
into binding relationships with international financial institutions (for whatever
reason) subsequently privatize more state-owned assets. We use the outstanding
level of financial obligations (relative to national GDP) to measure the strength of
a country’s relationships with the IFIs and hence the potential magnitude of the
market credibility boost.
The IMF variable comprises repurchase obligations to the IMF for all uses of
IMF resources (excluding those resulting from drawings on the reserve tranche),
including credit tranches, enlarged access resources, all special facilities (the
buffer stock, compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil facilities), trust fund
loans, and operations under the structural adjustment and enhanced structural
adjustment facilities. The World Bank variable comprises all International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans (at market rates) and International
Development Association credits (at concessional rates).
We  have hypothesized that that the impact of the IFIs on privatization is
increasing in the size of a country’s obligations to them—especially for the IMF.
Hence the coefficients on both IFI variables would be positive if the effect of con-
ditionality has been to increase the sale of state-owned assets and market valua-
tions of these sales.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents aggregate data on the financial impact of the IMF and World
Bank on the developing (low- and middle-income, based on 1980 GDP per capita
incomes) countries in this study between 1980 and 1999. High-income countries
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in this study owed the IMF money in the 1980s and 1990s.
The top panel of Table 2 demonstrates the large role played by the IFIs in the
developing world. Over the 1980s and 1990s, low-income countries had outstand-
ing obligations to the IMF and the World Bank that each year averaged 5.1 percent
and 16.1 percent of GDP, respectively. The numbers were smaller for middle-
income countries, but combined annual IMF and World Bank obligations consti-
tuted about one-eighth of GDP. In the developing world as a whole, outstanding
loans from the World Bank were about three times as large in dollar terms as those
from the IMF. However, since IMF conditionality was more constraining than the
World Bank variant, it is possible that the impact on privatization of IMF obliga-
tions was greater than that of World Bank loans.
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Table 2. Developing Countries and the IFIs, 1980–1999
Outstanding World Bank 
Outstanding IMF Obligations  Obligations (percent of 
(percent of GDP each year) GDP each year)
Low-income countries 5.1 16.5
Middle-income countries 1.5 3.5














Syrian Arab Republic 0.0 2.9
Oman 0.0 0.4
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.0 0.3
Malta 0.0 0.0





IMF-World Bank correlation 
for all developing countries 0.58
Note: We present aggregate data on the financial impact of the IMF and World Bank on the
developing (low- and middle-income) countries in this study over the period 1980–1999.The middle panel of the table represents the 10 countries with the largest out-
standing obligations to the IMF in the last two decades. Zambia and Guyana each
had outstanding IMF debt that averaged annually more than one-quarter of their
GDP, whereas the amounts ranged between 6 percent and 13 percent per year for
the other eight most heavily indebted countries. At the same time, countries with
large IMF obligations invariably borrowed considerable sums from the World
Bank as well. In the cases of Guyana and Zambia, IFI obligations constituted
almost 60 percent of GDP each year during the 1980s and 1990s. Outstanding
World Bank credit annually constituted fully one-half of Malawi’s GDP in the
same period. The other top 10 IMF debtors owed the World Bank between 13 per-
cent and 29 percent of their GDPs. Not surprisingly, 8 of the countries in this top
10 list were in sub-Saharan Africa.
The bottom panel lists the 10 developing countries that were least dependent
on the IFIs in the 1980s and 1990s. With the exception of residual unpaid debts
from IMF programs in the 1970s in Botswana, Iran, Oman, and Syria, these coun-
tries owed the IFIs no money in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of the countries on
this list were not surprising. After all, by the end of the 1980s Greece, Ireland, and
Singapore were all high-income countries. The other seven nations were already
classified as middle-income countries by 1980 and hence were less likely to
receive IFI assistance than their low-income colleagues. In contrast to the biggest
IMF and World Bank debtors, the bottom 10 countries were dispersed across sev-
eral continents.
In aggregate, there was a strong positive correlation (r = 0.58) between out-
standing obligations to the two IFIs among all the developing countries in our data
set. Countries that owed the IMF more money were likely also to have larger lines
of credit at the World Bank. This correlation, however, was far from perfect. Given
the differences in the types of conditionality agreements written by the IMF and
World Bank, it is important to analyze their effects on privatization separately.
Comparative Cases
Before moving to the multivariate statistics, it is useful to consider a paired com-
parison of the experiences of two countries to illustrate the plausibility of the
broader relationship we propose between privatization and IFI lending. Ghana and
Nigeria are low-income, nondemocratic countries in West Africa with functioning
stock markets. However, whereas Ghana was heavily dependent on IMF (and
World Bank) lending—particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s—Nigeria
was much less so. Ghana was a successful and large privatizer in the latter 1990s;
Nigeria was not (see Table 3).
In 1993, Ghana passed a privatization law and established the Divestiture
Implementation Committee to oversee the sale of its state-owned assets. The coun-
try subsequently privatized food-manufacturing enterprises (related to cocoa, one
of its primary exports), breweries, state-owned banks, and a minority stake in its
state-owned telecommunications operator, Ghana Telecom. The lion’s share of its
privatization revenues resulted from the sale of the Ashanti Goldfields company
(in the mining sector). The total revenues received from privatization during the
Nancy Brune,Geoffrey Garrett,and Bruce Kogut
2041990s were valued at 21.6 percent of Ghana’s 1985 GDP. In 1990, Ghana’s out-
standing IMF obligations totaled 12.7 percent of GDP. By 1999, Ghana had
reduced those obligations to 4.0 percent as a share of GDP, reflecting at least in
part the successes of its privatization program.
Nigeria, Ghana’s neighbor to the east, had much less success with its privati-
zation program. Under the direction of the National Council on Privatization
(NCP), the sale of state-owned assets got off to a quick start in Nigeria in the early
1990s. By 1993, it had divested a number of enterprises in the financial (banking
and insurance), agriculture, food-manufacturing, tourism, and transport (railroads)
sectors, as well as a share of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company. But
because of lack of investor interest, Nigeria’s privatization program abruptly stalled.
The national government has been unable to sell off several firms it considers
“crown jewels.” For example, the sale of the state-owned telecommunications
operator, NITEL, has been repeatedly postponed. In 1999, the government attempted
to reinvigorate its failing privatization program by creating the Bureau of Public
Enterprises to oversee the NCP. But this new initiative has yet to kick-start the sale
of the large set of assets that remain in the hands of the Nigerian state. During the
1990s as a whole, Nigeria privatized assets worth 4.2 percent of its 1985 GDP, but
almost all of these were sold before 1993.
Nigeria was among the sub-Saharan African countries least reliant on the IFIs
in the 1990s. The country had no outstanding obligations to the IMF during the
decade, and World Bank assistance was less than a third as large (relative to GDP)
as in neighboring Ghana. Interestingly, Nigeria stopped participating in all IMF
programs in 1994—the same year that its privatization program came grinding to
a halt—because of disagreements about the terms of policy conditionality attached
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Table 3. Ghana and Nigeria
Average IMF  Privatization 
Obligations Revenues 
(1990–1999) (1990–1999)  Size  of 
as percent  as percent of  State-Owned 
of GDP 1985 GDP Sector (1980)1 Deficit2 GDP Per Capita3
Ghana 9.3 21.6 10  1.5 379
Partial list of major privatized enterprises: food manufacturing enterprises (cocoa), breweries
(Achimota Brewery), Ashanti Goldfields Company, banking (Ghana Commercial Bank),
telecommunications (Ghana Telecom −30 percent).
Nigeria 0.0 4.2 10  5.1 257
Partial list of major privatized enterprises: tourism (hotels), Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation, banking (First Bank of Nigeria, United Bank), cement (Ashaka, Benue), food
manufacturing and production.
Note: Both countries are low-income and nondemocratic and have functioning stock markets.
1Code for Size of State-Owned Sector: 2 low, 4 low-medium, 6 medium, 8 medium-high, 10 high.
2Budget balance as share of GDP (1990–1999 average).
3GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) (1990–1999 average).to IMF loans.9 It was not that Nigeria did not need external financing. By 1991
Nigeria owed an estimated US$34 billion to members of the Paris Club and for-
eign commercial banks. According to the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance,
the total external debt outstanding at the end of 1999 was US$28 billion. Of the
total outstanding debt, the Paris Club constituted the highest source, with a share
of 73.2 percent in 1999.10
This Ghana-Nigeria comparison is consistent with our argument that there
may be an indirect benefit of accepting IFI loans, and the conditions attached to
them, in terms of generating investor confidence in national privatization pro-
grams. Ghana seems a real success story with respect to privatization, with the
IMF playing a leading role in economic policy formulation during the 1990s.
Nigeria was much more independent from the IFIs, and the IMF in particular, pre-
cisely because it was unwilling to accept the policy conditions attached to IMF
loans. But after a promising start, its privatization program collapsed because of a
lack of investor interest, which we surmise was because of a lack of confidence
that the Nigerian government, acting independently, would pursue the kinds of
market reforms required to make its privatized firms good investments. We now
demonstrate that this lesson of the Ghana-Nigeria comparison holds for the rest of
the developing world as well.
III. Results
This section reports our statistical analyses of the determinants of privatization,
focusing on the effects of outstanding obligations to international financial insti-
tutions. We begin with an aggregated cross-sectional analysis of privatization
between 1985 and 1999, regressed on variables for the first half of the 1980s. We
then estimate panel regressions to examine year-to-year relationships. Finally, we
check the robustness of our results by analyzing privatization dynamics and selec-
tion bias in privatization outcomes. In each set of analyses, there was a consistent
and strong relationship between IMF lending and privatization—privatization was
greater in countries with larger outstanding obligations to the IMF.
1985–1999 Cross Section
Table 4 reports the cross-sectional results for equations that regressed privatization
proceeds between 1985 and 1999 (as a proportion of 1985 GDP) on a series of vari-
ables measured from 1980 to 1984 (to mitigate potential problems with reverse
causality). In our baseline model presented in column 4.1, countries with larger
state-owned sectors and larger budget deficits in the early 1980s privatized more of
their economies. The parameter estimate for GDP per capita was positive and close
to statistical significance, implying that more developed countries privatized more.
Privatization revenues were greater in the countries of East Asia and the Pacific
than in the excluded reference regions of North America and Western Europe.
Nancy Brune,Geoffrey Garrett,and Bruce Kogut
206
9As late as 2001, Nigeria had failed to reach agreed policy targets with the IMF.
10Source: Central Bank of Nigeria: http://www.cenbank.org/extern_debt/htm.THE IMF AND THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF PRIVATIZATION
207
Table 4. Total Privatizations, 1985–19991
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Transactions as 
Developing Excluding  Dependent 
Baseline Countries Only Tobit Outliers Variable
GDP per capita (log) 1.631  1.591  1.514  1.20  −0.390** 
(1.299) (1.561) (1.258) (1.19) (0.159)
Size of the state-owned  1.124**  0.94  1.070**  0.598  0.152** 
sector in 1980 (0.499) (0.669) (0.485) (0.379) (0.061)
Budget balance  −0.299**  −0.397**  −0.292*  −0.308**  −0.012 
(percent of GDP) (0.134) (0.192) (0.147) (0.137) (0.023)
Functioning  stock  1.381 1.681 2.199  2.54  1.236*** 
market (2.059) (2.466) (2.096) (1.83) (0.276)
Government quality −0.048 0.09  0.001  −0.029 0.052 
(0.285) (0.400) (0.301) (0.265) (0.040)
World Bank outstanding  −0.07  −0.034  −0.018  −0.266  −0.026 
obligations (percent  (0.394) (0.421) (0.368) (0.253) (0.050)
of GDP)
IMF outstanding  0.493**  0.434*  0.532*  0.601***  0.068* 
obligations (0.234) (0.262) (0.299) (0.187) (0.041)
(percent of GDP)
East Asia and the Pacific 6.720*  −0.929 6.886**  7.88** 0.088 
(3.696) (6.685) (3.297) (3.62) (0.430)
Eastern  Europe  and  4.779 0.111 5.864  0.868  3.060*** 
Central Asia (8.315) (9.428) (5.734) (3.92) (0.751)
Latin America and  4.164  −0.989 4.395  5.11  0.104 
the Caribbean (3.620) (6.067) (3.185) (3.36) (0.419)
Middle East and  −3.61  −10.801* −3.195  −0.635  −0.820* 
North Africa (3.981) (6.268) (3.758) (3.33) (0.497)
South Asia −4.203  −9.244  −4.043  −1.71  −0.76 
(4.361) (6.709) (5.567) (3.82) (0.703)
Sub-Saharan Africa −3.255  −8.38 −3.304 0.042  −0.218 
(4.305) (6.483) (4.130) (3.63) (0.551)
Constant −14.497  −9.074  −14.793  −10.3 4.705*** 
(10.957) (14.428) (11.308) (10.1) (1.471)
Observations 96 70 96 93 96
R-squared 0.33 0.38 0.0558 0.37 0.0687
log likelihood  −316.45 −477.34
chibar2(01) = 3,978.85
Prob. > = chibar2 0.000
Notes: We report the cross-sectional results for equations that regressed privatization proceeds in
1985–1999 (as a percent of 1985 GDP) on a series of variables measured in 1980–1984. Standard
errors in parentheses.
1*** indicates p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates p < 0.10.Most importantly, the variable measuring outstanding obligations to the IMF
was positive, substantively large, and statistically significant, whereas the esti-
mated parameter for World Bank debt was negative and insignificant. For every
dollar of outstanding debt to the IMF in 1980–1984, a recipient country privatized
assets worth almost 50 cents over the next 15 years.
The remainder of our empirical analysis tests the robustness of this IMF-
privatization association. We exclude all high-income countries to ascertain
whether the IMF effect was influenced by the inclusion of 26 countries with no
outstanding obligations to the IFIs in the early 1980s. Column 4.2 shows that this
was not the case, though the IMF coefficient was somewhat smaller on the sample
of developing countries only. In column 4.3, we reestimate the baseline equation
using Tobit because our privatization data are left-censored at 0. The IMF coeffi-
cient was larger using the Tobit estimator than was the case in the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) equation, whereas the other estimated parameters were similar to
those reported in column 4.2.
In column 4.4, we exclude the largest outliers from the baseline regression
that arguably were unduly influential on the results reported. We calculate
DFITs statistics of influence, or the scaled difference between predicted values
for the ith case when the regression is estimated with and without the ith obser-
vation, for each observation and then drop the three countries (Bolivia, Hungary,
and Portugal) from our sample that were excessively influential on conventional
interpretations of DFITs (DFITS > 2* √(k/n)) (Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Not
surprisingly, the overall fit of our regression equation increases substantially when
we remove these outliers. More importantly, the IMF coefficient also increased
indicating that for every dollar of outstanding debt to the IMF in 1980–1984, a
country privatized assets worth almost 60 cents on the dollar over the next
period.
Finally, in column 4.5 we change the dependent variable from the value of pri-
vatized assets (relative to GDP) to the number of privatization transactions, using
a negative-binomial estimator to take into account the left-hand censoring of the
transactions variable at 0. Whereas the total revenues measure combines both the
volume of assets privatized and the market’s valuation of them, the transactions
variable is only a volume measure. The number of privatizations measured by
transactions varied enormously. In the sample of countries we use, the mean num-
ber of transactions completed over the period was 68 with a standard deviation of
152. Countries like Luxembourg and Papua New Guinea privatized only 1 enter-
prise, whereas Romania sold 1,180.
With the transaction variable as the dependent variable, the IMF effect was
marginally positive—for every percentage point of GDP owed to the IMF in
1980–1984, a country subsequently engaged in 0.07 privatization transactions.
While we cannot wholly reject the argument that IMF loans caused countries to
privatize more assets—a direct effect of conditionality—it is clear that this effect
was magnified many times in terms of the markets’valuations of privatized assets.
We estimate that a dollar owed to the IMF in the early 1980s resulted in the pri-
vatization of assets worth between 40 and 60 cents more. This suggests a very
powerful credibility effect associated with IMF lending.
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In particular, we should be cautious about drawing causal connections between a
country’s relationship with the IMF in the early 1980s and its privatization pro-
gram through the end of the 1990s. We now reconsider this relationship using
annual data.
Panel Analysis
The first column of Table 5 replicates column 4.1 but uses rectangular annual panel
data for 95 countries over 1985–1999.11 In this equation, all the regressors (except
initial size of the state-owned sector) were lagged one year and we include (but did
not report in the table) dummy variables for each year as well as for each region. Not
surprisingly the coefficients in Table 5.1 are much smaller than those in Table 4.1
because they measured annual effects rather than those aggregated over 15 years. The
positive effect of the presence of a functioning stock market on privatization revenues
was more pronounced in the time series, whereas the effects of budget deficits and
larger initial state-owned sector were weaker. As was the case in our cross-section
analysis, the parameter estimate for outstanding financial obligations to the World
Bank was again insignificant (though stronger than in the cross section).
The most important coefficient in Table 5.1 was the positive—but insignifi-
cant—impact of last year’s outstanding IMF credit on this year’s privatization
revenues. The positive and significant finding from Table 4 combined with the
insignificant effect in this equation suggests that the IMF-privatization revenues
relationship may have changed over time. Indeed, we would expect the relationship
to have grown increasingly strong over time, because the IMF’s commitment to
privatization, and to conditioning loans on the execution of national privatization
programs, increased significantly during the 1990s. We tested this hypothesis in
column 5.2 by interacting our IFI variables with a dummy variable for the 1990s.
As expected, column 5.2 shows that whereas outstanding IMF obligations had a
small negative impact on privatization revenues in the next year, this estimate was
reversed in direction and doubled in size for the 1990s; the yearly impact during the
1990s is estimated to be 0.043 (i.e., −0.024 + 0.067 =+ 0.043). That is, for every dol-
lar a country owed the IMF in the previous year during the 1990s, it privatized assets
worth 4 cents more in the current year. Over the whole decade, this effect would
have been 40 cents—quite similar to the aggregate effect estimated in the cross-
section regression in Table 4. In contrast with this over-time change in the IMF-
privatization relationship, outstanding obligations to the World Bank did not have a
significant positive effect on privatization revenues in the 1980s, and this effect less-
ened to near zero in the 1990s. These results are quite consistent with general views
about differences in the lending practices and policy views of the two institutions.12
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11Niger had to be excluded from the panel data analysis because of missing data on some independent
variables in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
12Because panel estimates are biased with fixed effects and lags, we also used the Arellano-Bond spec-
ification of generalized method of moments (GMM). With a single lag on the privatization variable, the
IMF effect remained significant at the 0.01 percent level (coefficient of 0.075); the World Bank variable
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Table 5. Annual Privatizations, 1985–19991
5.1 5.2 5.3
Before and 
Baseline After 1990 Additional Variables
GDP per capita (log)






World Bank outstanding 
obligations (percent of GDP)
World Bank X 1990s




Trade (percent of GDP)








Joint Hypothesis Test 
(IMF and IMF X 1990)
Notes: The first column of Table 5 replicates column 4.1 in Table 4 but uses annual panel data
for 95 countries in 1985–1999. All regressors were lagged one year. In column 5.2, we interacted our
IFI variables with a dummy variable for the 1990s. In column 5.3, we assessed the sensitivity of our
IMF result to the effects of other mediating variables common in work on international development.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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0.0770In column 5.3 we assess the sensitivity of our IMF result to the effects of other
mediating variables common in work on international development. We consider
the effects of democracy, international economic openness (measured by levels of
trade and foreign direct investment), and differences in legal systems (legal her-
itage) on privatization revenues. Though some of these variables were significant
(notably, differences in legal heritage), the IMF coefficient for the 1990s was unaf-
fected by their inclusion. In sum, Table 5 reinforces our central finding from Table 4,
with the modification that the positive effect of IMF obligations on privatization
revenues was a 1990s’ phenomenon.
Additional Robustness Checks: Selection and Dynamics
We conduct two final robustness checks for our central IMF-privatization result.
First, we correct for selection bias in the extent of national privatization programs,
using the procedure advocated by Heckman. Second, we take into account the fact
that countries’privatization programs tended to last for several years (i.e., creating
dynamic connections between last year’s and this year’s privatization revenues).
The results of these analyses are reported in Table 6.
The selection-corrected estimates are presented in column 6.1. The model
specification is full maximum likelihood, which permitted using the inverse Mills
ratio to calculate the probability density over the cumulative density function. This
ratio was then used in the estimating equation, along with the other regressors. We
use three variables to estimate the selection equation: a country’s budget balance,
domestic fixed investment, and foreign exchange reserves (all lagged one year).
The results of the likelihood test indicate that the selection model and the estimat-
ing model were very highly correlated and that the bias (downward) significant.
But once these selection effects are taken into account, it is still the case that the
more money a country owed the IMF in a given year, the more privatization rev-
enues were generated in the following year.
Column 6.2 includes a country’s lagged privatization revenues as a regres-
sor to take into account the fact that national privatization programs typically
last several years. We would expect that once a country began privatizing it
would continue to do so and hence that the lagged dependent variable would have
a positive and significant impact on this year’s privatization revenues. Column 6.2
demonstrates that this dynamic was strongly evident in our privatization data.
Nonetheless, even when we control for past privatization, a country’s outstand-
ing obligations to the IMF were still positively associated with its subsequent
privatization revenues. Given that we controlled for the propensity for privatiza-
tion programs to persist over time, this annual—incremental—IMF effect is
striking.
In summary, Table 6 confirms that IMF lending had a positive impact on pri-
vatization revenues. This positive impact persisted even after correcting for the
propensity of countries already committed to market reform to also participate in
IMF programs and after taking into account that once a country began to privatize
state-owned assets, it was likely to continue privatizing for several years.
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Table 6. Selection Effects and Dynamics1
6.1 6.2
Selection Dynamics
Privatization (percent of GDP), lagged
GDP per capita (log)
Size of the state-owned sector in 1980
Budget balance (percent of GDP)
Functioning stock market
Government quality
World Bank outstanding obligations (percent of GDP)
IMF outstanding obligations (percent of GDP)
Constant
Selection equation
Budget balance (percent of GDP)
Domestic investment (percent of GDP)










Wald test of independent equations chi2(1) =
Prob. > chi2
Notes: We conducted two final robustness checks on our central IMF-privatization result. In col-
umn 6.1, we used the Heckman model to correct for selection effects. In column 6.2, we included a
country’s lagged privatization revenues as a regressor to take into account the fact that privatization
programs typically last several years. Standard errors in parentheses.













































































We  analyze the relationships between the IFIs and privatization in three steps.
First, we use cross-section regressions from 1985 to 1999 to ascertain whether out-
standing IFI obligations affected the scale of a country’s overall privatization pro-
grams. The central result of this analysis was that the more countries owed the
IMF before 1985, the greater were their subsequent revenues raised from the sale
of state-owned assets. Second, we analyze panel data to see whether this aggre-
gated effect was evident in year-to-year data: did how much a country owed the
IMF last year increase its privatization revenues this year? Our analysis answered
this question affirmatively but with an important qualification. The impact of IMF
lending on privatization revenues was a 1990s’ phenomenon—when IMF condi-
tionality with respect to privatization hardened. Third, we control for significant
selection effects and for over-time persistence in national privatization programs.
Doing so did not weaken our central IMF-privatization result.
What do these results mean? They have little to say about the efficiency of pri-
vatization, per se. But they do point to a critical role played by the IMF in altering
market perceptions of country risk. It has long been a theoretical defense of IMF
bailouts that they are required not only to provide short-term liquidity but also to
stave off disastrous self-fulfilling fears in the market place. Consistent with this
line of argument and with recent studies questioning the direct impact of the IMF
on economic growth, our results suggest that the primary value of the IMF may be
financial market enhancement rather than the provision of capital.
Recent evidence has failed to find a strong catalytic role for IMF programs
with respect to overall capital flows into developing countries. Our results indi-
cate, however, that IMF programs have attracted capital for the specific purpose of
purchasing formerly state-owned assets. In the longer run, of course, this program
success could have important implications for broader processes of economic
development through attracting more capital investments at more favorable dis-
count rates. Even if the efficiency-enhancing effects of privatization do not seem
as powerful in practice as they are in theory, and even if IMF lending does not have
direct effects on economic growth, privatization is more attractive to investors in
cases where the privatizing government owes the IMF money and is subject to the
policy conditionality.
This conclusion points to an important development tool available to countries
and the Fund. Of course, the implication should not be that privatization is rec-
ommended to all countries at all times. If enhancing credibility is a primary con-
tribution of the IMF, it is important to consider other policy measures that might
deliver this outcome more efficiently and at less cost in social and economic terms.
Critics of international financial organizations have long noted that the IMF is an
economic institution influencing the political economy of investment. Our find-
ings confirm that financial markets perceive the IMF as playing an important role
in enhancing the credibility of governments in raising foreign capital and in
increasing the revenues from the massive privatization of the past two decades.
The increased revenues represent a large, important capital flow to poor countries
that should not be underestimated.
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Revenues  (percent of  Size of the
(billions, 1985 GDP, State-Owned
1985 US$) unweighted) Transactions Sector in 19801
East Asia and the Pacific
Australia 68.91 25.2 118 medium-low
China 22.22 8.1 281 high
Indonesia 6.26 6.4 50 medium-high
Japan 164.39 4.3 12 low
Korea, Rep. of 15.37 7.2 30 medium-low
Malaysia 11.45 28.2 91 medium
New Zealand 13.63 27.0 66 medium
Papua New Guinea 0.24 8.2 1 medium
Philippines 5.32 10.1 118 medium-low
Singapore 4.80 13.3 25 medium-low
Thailand 5.44 8.0 39 medium
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Hungary 15.52 31.6 1037 high
Romania 2.32 5.6 1180 high
Turkey 5.49 4.9 236 medium-high
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina 42.68 22.1 230 medium
Bolivia 1.84 37.6 98 medium-high
Brazil 73.12 13.4 215 medium-high
Chile 7.87 25.3 89 medium
Colombia 9.09 15.3 65 medium-high
Costa Rica 0.06 0.8 8 medium
Dominican Republic 0.43 5.1 6 medium
Ecuador 0.13 1.0 16 medium-high
El Salvador 1.14 18.0 23 medium-low
Guatemala 1.32 12.8 8 low
Guyana 0.18 36.5 32 high
Haiti 0.02 0.8 3 medium-low
Honduras 0.11 3.8 41 medium-low
Jamaica 0.70 20.7 47 medium-high
Mexico 40.36 16.5 317 medium-high
Nicaragua 0.14 6.6 78 high
Panama 1.92 30.7 21 medium
Paraguay 0.02 0.4 5 low
Peru 8.80 19.5 196 medium
Trinidad and Tobago 0.46 8.2 22 medium-high
Uruguay 0.02 0.2 12 medium




Revenues  (percent of  Size of the
(billions, 1985 GDP, State Owned
1985 US$) unweighted) Transactions Sector in 19801
Middle East and North Africa
Bahrain 0.30 8.1 4 medium
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 5.31 12.8 165 medium-high
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.02 0.0 3 medium-high
Israel 7.26 14.0 50 medium-high
Jordan 0.06 1.2 6 high
Kuwait 2.19 12.4 21 medium-high
Morocco 3.91 15.4 84 medium-high
Oman 0.06 0.8 8 medium-high
Tunisia 0.58 4.5 76 high
United Arab Emirates 0.19 0.6 2 medium-low
North America and Western Europe
Austria 11.05 6.0 51 medium-high
Belgium 8.68 3.9 13 medium-low
Canada 23.90 5.2 77 low
Denmark 9.33 6.1 13 medium-low
Finland 10.74 9.4 46 medium-low
France 89.28 7.1 58 medium
Greece 9.86 10.0 46 medium-high
Iceland 0.33 5.7 27 low
Ireland 5.97 14.2 17 medium-low
Italy 102.20 11.4 89 medium
Luxembourg 1.07 10.4 1 medium-low
Malta 0.28 15.0 2 medium
Netherlands 17.22 5.4 52 low
Norway 2.65 2.3 14 medium
Portugal 24.65 32.7 92 medium-high
Spain 49.67 11.3 90 medium
Sweden 12.86 6.2 21 medium
Switzerland 4.60 1.7 3 low
United Kingdom 130.09 14.7 139 medium
United States 7.75 0.1 20 low
Southeast Asia
Bangladesh 0.06 0.3 32 medium-high
India 8.29 4.1 96 high
Pakistan 2.22 6.1 109 high
Sri Lanka 0.84 10.2 98 medium-high
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burkina Faso 0.02 0.9 35 medium-high
Cameroon 0.09 0.9 31 medium
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 0.00 0.0 23 high
Congo, Rep. of 0.04 1.6 67 high
Côte d’Ivoire 0.68 7.8 96 high
Ethiopia 0.35 8.9 162 medium-high
(continued)Average 
Revenues 
Revenues  (percent of  Size of the
(billions, 1985 GDP, State-Owned
1985 US$) unweighted) Transactions Sector in 19801
Gabon 0.03 0.8 8 medium-high
Gambia, The 0.01 4.1 32 medium-high
Ghana 0.90 21.6 227 high
Guinea-Bissau 0.01 2.8 21 medium-high
Kenya 0.23 3.7 190 high
Malawi 0.06 5.5 73 high
Mali 0.07 3.2 68 medium
Niger2 0.00 0.3 29 medium
Nigeria 0.85 4.4 95 high
Senegal 0.23 6.3 54 medium
South Africa 4.53 3.4 33 medium-high
Togo 0.06 5.4 55 high
Uganda 0.17 5.4 101 medium-high
Zambia 0.38 11.2 253 high
Zimbabwe 0.78 14.6 9 medium-high
Source: Brune (2004).
1Gwartney, Lawson, and Block (1996).
2Not included in panel analyses because of data limitations.
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Note: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
Lagged value of privatization
revenues as percent of GDP
Size of state-owned sector in 1980;
(0–10 score, with 10 = extensive
state ownership)
Gross domestic product per capita
(constant US$), logged
Overall budget balance as share of
GDP
IMF financing as a share (percent)
of GDP
EBRD and IBRD loans as a share
(percent) of GDP*
Dummy variable = 1 if country has
stock market
Exports plus imports as share of
GDP
Foreign direct investment, net
inflows as share of GDP
Dummy = 1 if country has
democratic regime
Sum of corruption, rule of law, and
bureaucratic quality scores (0–18,
with 18 = high quality of
government)
Dummy = 1 if country has British
(common law) legal heritage
Dummy = 1 if country has French
(civil law) legal heritage
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